Developing the Incentivized Action View of Institutional Reality by Smit, J.P. et al.
Synthese
DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0370-5
Developing the incentivized action view of institutional
reality
J. P. Smit · Filip Buekens · Stan du Plessis
Received: 20 March 2013 / Accepted: 11 November 2013
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly
accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like,
exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting
note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed
the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view,
understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions
that are associated with the institution and how we are incentivized to perform these
actions. In this paper we develop the incentivized action view by extending it to insti-
tutions like property, promises and complex financial organisations like companies.
We also highlight exactly how the incentivized action view differs from the Searlean
view, discuss the method appropriate to such study and discuss some of the virtues of
the incentivized action view.
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1 Searle: the collective acceptance of status functions
Searle (1995, 2010) has claimed that it is constitutive of the existence of an institution
that we collectively accept that a (type of) object has a certain status-function. The
problem that Searle tries to solve arises from the fact that certain objects in the world,
typically money, borders, driver’s licences and the like, perform social roles that cannot
be understood purely in virtue of the physical properties of these objects. Since money
is, in a sense, just pieces of paper, borders are lines that need not be intrinsically difficult
to cross, and driver’s licences are typically just bits of laminated paper, the question
arises: how do these objects manage to do what they do, i.e. serve as a medium of
exchange, serve as national boundaries and certify one’s ability to drive?
Searle’s ingenious answer to this question is that these objects ‘do what they do’ in
virtue of the fact that we collectively regard them as having certain status-functions. In
this way we collectively regard certain bits of paper as being a medium of exchange,
we collectively regard certain lines as being borders, and we collectively regard the
laminated bits of paper as certifying that we are legally allowed to drive. This means
that such objects can, for the most part, be thought of as having the logical structure
X counts as Y in C . The X -term is the non-institutional characterization of the object,
the Y -term is the institutional characterization of the object, and the C-term refers
to the context in which the object counts as having such social properties. Consider,
for example, a piece of paper currency. It would seem to fit Searle’s formula as it is
a piece of paper that counts as currency in contexts where it can be used to effect
trade.
Searle views institutional facts as constituting a “huge, invisible ontology” (2005,
p. 1) that cannot be fully described without employing terminology that is irreducibly
institutional. We think that this irreducibility claim is too strong. One way of seeing
the problem that we have with Searle’s irreducibility-thesis is to ask how one would
go about defining a notion like money. In the Searlean theory, something is money if
we collectively regard it as being money. Such a definition does not get us very far, as
it does not tell us what we are regarding something as if we regard it as money. Searle
acknowledges this, and states that we may try to define it in terms of other notions,
but that we will not be able to define it in terms of notions that are not, themselves,
institutional (see Searle 1995, p. 32, compare Ruben 1997). This traps us in a sort
of definitional circle where even ostensive definitions would seem to be of no help,
as all parties agree that no physical property of dollar bills can serve to capture the
social role of money. Searle denies that there is anything inherently problematic about
being caught in such a circle (2005, p. 52). We do not share his confidence in this
matter.
In contrast to the above, the incentivized action account of institutional reality,
proposed in Smit et al. (2011), avoids such a definitional circle. On the incentivized
action view it is claimed that institutional facts can be individuated, and understood
completely, in terms of certain types of actions, namely the ones that we are incen-
tivized to perform when confronted with some institutional object. The basic idea is
that, where an institutional fact exists, this is always a matter of some people being
incentivized, not merely by the brute nature of the relevant object, but by human agency
(punishments, rewards) or moral belief, to perform some specifiable action or set of
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actions. If institutional reality can be captured in this manner, then, provided we can
characterize the relevant actions in non-institutional terms, we can similarly charac-
terize the institutional facts in such terms. Hence we can reject Searle’s idea of the
irreducibility of institutional reality and the very idea of objects that exist in virtue of
being collectively represented as existing.
In this paper we develop the incentivized action view by, firstly, defining the notion
of ownership and the notion of a promise in terms of incentivized action. This is done in
order to show that the incentivized action view can handle radically different types of
institutions and as these notions are useful in achieving our second objective, namely
showing that the incentivized action view can, in principle, explain complex financial
entities like limited liability companies, etc. We then highlight the ‘bottom-up’ nature
of the incentivized action view, discuss the method appropriate to such study and some
of the virtues of thinking of institutional reality in terms of incentivized action. We
start with a brief explanation of the incentivized action view.
2 The incentivized action view of institutional facts
2.1 Institutional objects and artefacts
In Smit et al. (2011) the notion of a traffic light is defined in terms of the fact that we
are incentivized to coordinate our driving behaviour (typically by performing actions
like stopping on red, going on green, etc.) with a certain set of lights (2011, p. 5);
the notion of a border is defined as a line, whether concrete or abstract, that divides
two areas that we are differently incentivized towards (2011, p. 11); and the notion of
money is defined as an object, either abstract or concrete, that we are incentivized to
acquire for exchange (2011, pp. 11–20). One aspect of the above definitions should
immediately be noted, namely that, while the above definitions require that people
be somehow incentivized to perform the relevant actions, the source and nature of
the incentivization are not individuating facts. In other words, the above definitions
allow for traffic lights, borders and money to come about in a variety of ways and for a
variety of reasons. This means that, while all three of the above institutions are currently
typically brought about by grand-scale institutions like states, this is not definitionally
required, and so the ontological nature of these objects can be characterized without
requiring a prior analysis of institutions like the state.
The guiding idea behind the incentivized action view is that the strategy of defining
institutional objects in terms of incentivized action(s) can be generalised to all institu-
tional objects. Hence the key claim behind the incentivized action view is that, where
institutional objects are concerned, it will always turn out that, due to human action or
moral belief, such ‘objects’ give some relevant subjects a reason to act in various ways
and that, without the things providing such reasons, we would not say that the relevant
institutional object exists. This is not a trivial claim. Borders that no-one heeds will
eventually disappear off the map qua borders, bits of paper that no-one has any reason
to trade will eventually not be considered money anymore, and so on. This is not true
of most ordinary objects; rocks that no-one throws will forever be rocks and numbers
that are never used in computation will forever be numbers. We take it that this is the
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crucial clue concerning the nature of institutions, as it suggests that we can individuate
institutional facts by the associated actions1
An intuitive way of explaining the incentivized action view is by contrasting insti-
tutional objects with another class of objects that also feature a close link between the
nature of the object and the existence of a reason for action, namely ordinary artefacts
like chairs, houses and hamburgers. Chairs are things that we generally have a reason
to sit on as they offer us a good resting place, houses are things that we generally have
a reason to live in as they offer shelter and hamburgers are things that we generally
have a reason to eat as they offer nourishment. In the case of such artefacts, the rele-
vant ‘incentivization’ is accomplished in virtue of physical properties of the objects,
delicately coupled with and attuned to certain basic facts about human psychology
and physiology.
Institutional objects differ from ordinary artefacts in that the latter do not provide
a reason for action solely in virtue of our psychological properties, our physiological
properties and the intrinsic properties of the object. A line drawn in the sand, while
well-suited to being a border in ways that a block of gold, or lights on top of a pole
are not, does not, even in conjunction with our physiology and psychology, serve to
give us a reason to not cross it. The incentivization done by the line is incomplete;
the full incentivization needs to be brought about by some human action, or moral
belief, that serves to incentivize us not to cross the line in the sand. This can be
done by some credible threat about what will happen if the line is crossed, or due
to the belief that crossing the line without permission is immoral, or some mixture
of moral and prudential motivation. Once this is done the incentivization is sufficient
for the line to become a border. But, and this is the important point, while the incen-
tivization of the incentivized is brought about by an incentivizer independently of
the nature of the object, this is the only relevant difference between an artefact and
an institutional object. It would be profoundly odd to talk of the reason for action
that derives from the nature of hamburgers and chairs as showing that these objects
are constitutively imbued with ‘deontic powers’. On the incentivized action view it is
equally odd to say, just because the incentivization in question is partly brought about
by an incentivizer, that money and borders are constitutively imbued with deontic
powers.
2.2 Rules of the game and clarifications
We use the term ‘institutional fact’ as it is used by Searle, i.e. as a technical term to
refer to phenomena that are essentially similar to his paradigm cases and that pre-
theoretically fit the ‘X counts as Y in C’ characterization. Note that Searle does not
use ‘institutional fact’ as a catch-all category to cover all objects that are not obviously
physical, or that involve human practice, or that the ordinary term ‘institution’ applies
1 Searle has, upon occasion, made remarks that similarly indicate a close connection between institutional
objects and actions. Consider: “Social objects are always... constituted by social acts; and, in a sense, the
object is just the continuous possibility of the activity” (1994, p. 36). Or: “What we think of as social objects...
are in fact placeholders for patterns of activities” (2005, p. 57). We think that a deep understanding of these
points should lead one to reject the collective acceptance view in favour of the incentivized action view.
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to. For example, Searle treats an abstract line2 like the sequence of extensionless points
between Colorado and Utah as a brute fact (2003, p. 308), treats a piece of music as a
non-institutional fact (2003, p. 305) and does not view science, religion or education
as institutions (2005, p. 19; 2010, p. 92). Hence we take it that our account can avail
itself of things like abstract objects, ordinary artefacts, actions, beliefs and other types
of things that do not obviously fit the ‘X counts as Y in C’ characterization and that
he has never claimed to be institutional in the relevant sense. Note that such things
include moral norms and beliefs; Searle has never indicated that either a norm like
‘thou salt not kill’, or the belief that one should not kill, are institutional in the relevant
sense. We feel free to avail ourselves of things that philosophers are committed to
accounting for anyway, in virtue of non-institutional reality, i.e. things like abstract
objects, artefacts, actions, abilities, beliefs and so on.
We do not take a stand on the nature of collective intentionality. Searle claims that
the sense of collective acceptance used in his theory is not something that can be
reduced to a matter of a group of individuals who individually accept that some object
is to count as having a certain status-function (2010, pp. 45–48). We doubt this claim,
but will not focus on it, beyond giving examples of cases where institutional facts
are created without any collective acceptance.3 Our problem is with Searle’s strong
irreducibility-thesis, not with collective intentionality.
Note that we do not in any sense deny that institutional facts and objects exist.
This is emphatically not the case; everyone agrees that money, borders and limited
liability companies are real. We simply claim that for institutional reality to exist
just is for an ordinary bit of non-institutional reality, individuated by a non-intrinsic
property, namely some incentivized action relevant to it, to exist. In this way the same
mountain range can be a border at one time and not be a border at another time, without
this being due to any physical change intrinsic to the mountain range, but due to the
relevant incentives no longer obtaining. The border, however, qua institutional object,
is no more than the mountain range, provided that the relevant incentives obtain. Note
that it is not a peculiarity of institutional facts that non-intrinsic properties may be
individuating properties. Consider footprints4; if I see a footprint in the sand and
scratch out an exact replica next to it, the replica is still not a footprint. It is essential
to a footprint that it must be the mark that has been left by a foot descending into the
sand. Footprints are individuated by their causal histories, despite such causal histories
not being intrinsic properties of footprints.
Note that our talk about incentives is not supposed to indicate any allegiance to
the idea that people are rational actors in the economic sense, or that we exhaustively
calculate the pros and cons of doing something before acting. Also note that we are not
cynics who think that all apparently altruistic action is actually based on self-interest
or anything of the sort. Rather our talk of incentives reflects the fact that human action
is motivated, i.e. based on reasons. These reasons come in many kinds; people may
act for reasons that are selfish, altruistic, self-regarding or other-regarding, moral or
2 Any account of institutional reality must presuppose notions like abstract objects; it would be very odd
to deny the theorist use of numbers when explaining social security numbers, winning lottery numbers, etc.
3 For a non-Searlean view that is mostly congenial to our way of looking at things, see Tieffenbach (2010).
4 This example adapted from Stalnaker (1989, p. 289).
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prudential, and so on. When we say that someone is incentivized to perform an action
we merely mean that there is, for that person, some reason for action, whatever this
may be.
3 Ownership and exchange
3.1 Ownership defined
Smit et al. (2011) defined money as an object that we are incentivized to acquire
for exchange, rather than for direct consumption. The matter of ‘being incentivized
to acquire for exchange’ is supposed to capture what fiat currency, gold currencies,
tins of mackerel, shells, large stones, virtual currencies like bitcoins5, cigarettes, etc.
have in common in cases where they ‘function as money’.6 Under the appropriate
circumstances the incentives that operate in a society can be such that a significant
amount of people have reason to acquire objects from a specific class for exchange
rather than consumption. If this institution is stable, i.e. enough people have reason to
acquire the objects for exchange, and over a long enough time-period, we express this
fact by saying that such objects are ‘money’.
‘Money’, above, was defined in terms of ‘exchange’. ‘Exchange’ is itself an institu-
tional notion, and so the proponent of the incentivized action view owes a non-Searlean
account of ‘exchange’. As ‘exchange’ can be defined as ‘a transfer of ownership’, we
will do so by defining the notion of ‘ownership’. The general strategy, as explained
above, is to identify institutional facts with what they give us reason to do, i.e. with
a certain simple or complex incentivization structure. In general, and ignoring some
details that depend on the vagaries of various legal systems7, owning something means
that the owner can use the object without third parties interfering with such use. Such
unencumbered use comes about as third parties are disincentivized to interfere with the
owner’s use of the object. Hence we define ownership in the following way: a subject,
S, owns an object, o, if, and only if, third parties are sufficiently disincentivized from
interfering with S’s use of o. Practically speaking, this means that, when I say I own
my pen, this means that I can write with it, use it to help balance an uneven table
or chew on it, and that third parties are disincentivized to interfere with any of this.
This incentivization is accomplished by moral beliefs about private property, the infor-
mal social norms governing such interference (unauthorised use, theft, etc.) and the
police’s willingness and ability to punish physical interference with how I use my pen.
Note that ownership can, in principle, be sustained by radically different types of
incentives. This can be seen by constructing various ‘Robinson Crusoe - style’ cases in
5 A non-state issued, wholly electronic currency (www.bitcoin.org).
6 A further problem concerning money is the so-called problem of ‘free-standing Y -terms’, first raised by
Barry Smith in his exchange with Searle (2003). The total number of notes and coins in circulation only
amount to a fraction of the actual money in existence. This raises the question: where is the thing that
Searle’s X -term is supposed to refer to? In Smit at al. (2011, pp. 17–20), we defend the view that, where
fiat money is concerned, the actual ‘thing’ traded is the abstract ability to acquire goods and services.
7 An incentivizing agency may choose to protect only certain uses. We won’t deal with this complication
here.
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which some or other source of incentives is completely absent. Consider two people
stranded on an island, where one is the selfish and powerful Jack. If Jack declares
that he will use any object in any way he sees fit and that he recognises no constraint
on his own action, then, provided Jack has the (brute) power to make good on such a
claim (i.e. no-one can meaningfully disincentivize Jack from performing such actions)
then he owns, in any conceivably relevant sense, everything on the island. Or consider
the case of two people with sincerely held moral beliefs about private property who
wash up on an island. If both are committed to the claim that, if anyone ‘mixes their
labour’ with a natural object and in doing so creates an artefact, then they are entitled
to unencumbered use of such an artefact, and this belief regulates their actions, then
both people ‘own’, in any conceivably relevant sense, everything that they create.
The above also indicates that ownership is a matter of the relevant incentives being
present and does not constitutively or conceptually presuppose an institution like the
state. This can also be seen by looking at the historical record. Economists have cat-
alogued a variety of different, non-state institutions that have effectively created, in
whole or in part, the incentives that constitute property rights. These include coalitions
of Maghribi traders of the 11th century (Greif 1993), the Bourse in Amsterdam in the
17th century (Greif 1993), cattlemen’s associations and land clubs in the American
West (Smith 2003) and countless others. The Bourse in Amsterdam is especially inter-
esting as many of the financial instruments that were traded on it, such as short sales,
forward contracts and options were in legal limbo, or actually illegal, until formal
institutions caught up to where the market had led. Despite this the degree of own-
ership that arose from social reputation and other informal sources of incentivization
sustained an active market (Greif 2005). Hence property can exist without being cre-
ated by a state, which means, once again, that we can define the notion of property
without first needing to define other institutions, most prominently the notion of a state.
3.2 Does our analysis presuppose other institutions?
It may well be thought that the problem that Searle addresses has merely been swept
under the rug. Is it not so that, in most cases, the incentives sustaining ownership only
came about because of another institution, i.e. in virtue of the institutions like the state
imposing certain penalties on those who do interfere with one’s use of what you ‘own’?
This may well be so, but as an objection to our account, it misses the point. Note that,
independently of the merit of the objection, we have succeeded in defining ownership
without reference to Searlean mechanisms or irreducibly institutional facts. While
there must be some source of the relevant incentives, facts about such a source are not
individuating facts and hence ownership can be characterized without mentioning the
source of such incentivization. All that is constitutively required is that the relevant
incentives are such that it becomes a good idea to not interfere with someone’s use of an
object. It will typically be the case that some are more swayed by the relevant incentives
than others. It will also typically be the case that some are relevantly disincentivized
for purely for practical reasons, whereas some will be so incentivized partly in virtue
of thinking that the incentivizer is morally justified in creating the relevant incentives.
Others may think that not interfering with such use is a morally binding norm of
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behaviour. These differences are irrelevant to the nature of ownership; all that matters
is that the relevant disincentivization is somehow brought about.
Note that we are not denying that the incentivized action view needs to eventually
give some non-Searlean account of the state. The state (and countries, laws, etc.) are
institutions, and so clearly we do. We cannot do all things at once and so leave it for
future work; our current point is just that the nature of ownership can be characterized
without reference to other institutions.
3.3 An objection concerning the ownership/possession distinction
We need, when discussing issues like non-state sanctioned forms of ownership, to be
careful to distinguish matters of substance from matters of terminology. Economists
typically consider examples like the Bourse in 17th century Amsterdam to be cases
of non-state sanctioned ownership of goods. Cannot, however, all such examples be
rejected a priori by objecting that someone who ‘owns’ a forward contract on the
Amsterdam Bourse in the 17th century does not really own the forward contract, but
merely has some sort of possession of it? We think that such an objection misses the
mark by confusing a narrow, legal sense of ‘ownership’ with a broader use of the term.
In the legal sense of ‘ownership’, of course, the person who owns the forward contract
does not own it. But, then again, by such a standard, no cigarettes or sea-shells have
ever been money, no borders have ever come about by informal practice and it is a
priori impossible for some small community to agree to put up a ‘real’ traffic light
without involving the state. Note that, by such a standard, the study of institutional
facts would be very easy; everything is what the law says it is. Our interest, however,
is not in this narrow legal sense of these terms, but, as has already been explained, in
how it comes about that certain objects play a social role that is not fulfilled purely
due their brute nature. Facts concerning such objects are often tracked by what may
be termed the ‘broader’ use of terms like ‘ownership’, ‘money’ and ‘borders’, used to
refer to de facto, if not always de jure, states of affairs, and so our interest mainly lies
in this broader sense of ‘ownership’, ‘money’, ‘border’, etc. Hence, the fact that some8
of what we will call ‘ownership’, legally only counts as ‘possession’, is no more an
objection to our view than the fact that, legally speaking, cigarettes have never been
legal tender, or that the UN does not consider Somaliland9 a country, etc. The fact
that, legally, Microsoft is a ‘person’ has little relevance for philosophy of mind; in the
same way the fact that, legally, no-one ‘owns’ illegal drugs has little relevance for the
study of the broader notion of ownership.10
With the notion of ‘ownership’ as third-party disincentivization in place we can
now define the notion of a transfer of ownership. Ownership is transferred when the
8 Namely where non-trivial, extra-legal third party disincentivization is involved.
9 Legally Somaliland is considered an autonomous region of Somalia, but it is typically considered a de
facto state.
10 The difference arises in virtue of the fact that the interest of law is regulative, and its definitions implicitly
amount to a commitment concerning where the state will and will not apply its incentivizing muscle. Our
interests are descriptive, and supposed to capture what actually exists, not what the state commits itself to
doing.
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subject, whose use of an object third parties are disincentivized to interfere with, is
switched. In other words, my pen becomes Bob’s pen when Bob is the person whose
use should not be interfered with, and I join the ranks of those who are disincentivized
to interfere with Bob’s use of the pen. This definition of exchange, then, leads us to
a view of money that does not tempt us to postulate a new, autonomous ontological
realm. Something is money in case I am incentivized to acquire it not for consumption,
but in order to effect exchanges, where such exchanges are understood as bringing it
about that the agent, whose use of an object others are disincentivized to interfere
with, is switched by mutual consent.
4 Promises and agreements
We now turn our attention to a completely different kind of institution, namely
promises. In accord with the incentivized action view we take it that the way to answer
such a question is to ask about the actions that are incentivized in virtue of the existence
of a promise. Here the answer is simple: the action that is primarily associated with a
promise is that of keeping or not keeping it. This is not, however, unique to promises.
Consider the following two utterances, both made by Jean:
(1) I will go to the party tonight.
(2) I promise I will go to the party tonight.
Utterance (1) can be understood in two different ways. It can, firstly, be the mere
expression of an intention that does not bring with it any specific commitment or
obligation. This would be the case if Jean was merely mentioning this fact to a person
who does not have any particular interest in whether Jean attends the party or not.
Call this the intention reading. (1) can also, however, be understood as involving a
commitment on the part of Jean to go to the party. Call this the commitment reading.
While such an utterance can, under certain circumstances, amount to a full-blown
promise, it need not. We generally recognise a level of commitment between merely
expressing an intention to act in a certain way and promising to act in a certain way.
What is the difference between the intention reading of (1), the commitment reading
of (1) and the full-blown promise in (2)? The difference lies in the seriousness of the
consequences of not acting in accord with the expressed intention. If Jean merely
uttered (1) with the intention reading in mind, then he will suffer no harm in virtue of
not going to the party. On the commitment reading, however, Jean can expect to suffer
adverse consequences if he does not go the party. The person he spoke to is likely to
feel somewhat aggrieved, and Jean somewhat guilty, about the fact that he did not act
as he said he would. These consequences are magnified if Jean had uttered (2). The
person who Jean made the promise to is likely to feel extremely aggrieved if Jean does
not go to the party, Jean may well feel very guilty, and, in future, when Jean makes a
promise, he may well be met with rolled eyes.
The difference, in other words, between a mere expression of an intention, the
expression of a commitment and a full-blown promise lies in the level of sanction that
results from non-compliance. We believe that this fact holds the key to understanding
the institution of promising. What makes some act a promise is that the promisor
willingly and intentionally opens himself up to the possibility of such sanction. This
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allows us to characterize an explicit promise as the expression of an intention to act in
a certain way, coupled with an expressed willingness to be open to a relatively extreme
sanction if the action is not accomplished.
To clarify the basic idea, imagine a society of English speakers who do not use the
word ‘promise’ or any simple equivalent. They do, however, have a practice they call
‘inviting being socially sanctioned’ and say things like “I will go to the party. If I don’t,
you may think ill of me”. Now consider the case of Robert, who says something like
this to his friend Eugene. The vital thing to notice is that Robert, in virtue of having
uttered this phrase, has an increased reason to go to the party. Firstly, not going to
the party after having invited the potential sanction is more likely to cause Eugene
to think ill of him than if he had not explicitly invited the sanction. This is so, partly
because Robert has no plausible way of denying that he knew Eugene will be relying,
to a significant degree, on him going to the party. If Robert does not go he implicitly
signals to Eugene that he does not much care about any problems that may arise for
Eugene in virtue of his inaction. Robert also signals to Eugene that Eugene’s opinion
of Robert does not much matter to Robert, and hence Robert’s not going constitutes
a type of insult. The second reason that Robert has to go to the party is that not going
will decrease the chances that Eugene will, in future, attach a higher credence to the
likelihood of Robert performing some action in virtue of the fact that Robert explicitly
invited some sanction for non-compliance. Thirdly, Eugene is likely to tell others about
Robert’s actions, and hence third parties are also less likely to attach higher credence
to the likelihood of Robert performing some action in virtue of the fact that Robert
explicitly opened himself up to the possibility of social sanction. Now further assume
that this society generally holds the moral belief that one should perform those actions
where one explicitly invites sanction. Given this fact, Robert may well feel guilty if
he does not go, Eugene and third parties may well attach moral blame to Robert, etc.
Given all the negative consequences that may well accrue to Robert, one may ask
why he would ever explicitly open himself up to the possibility of social sanction. It
is, however, precisely because non-compliance may lead to such consequences, that
the practice has a point. If Robert wishes to induce others to trust him, then the act
of opening himself up to extreme sanction, should he fail, gives Robert an increased
reason to perform the relevant action. This means that others, i.e. Eugene and third
parties, have an increased reason to trust Robert. In this way the act of inviting social
sanction allows Robert to gain trust, and hence to undertake projects that depend on
being trusted by others.
We see no reason to deny that what happens in the above hypothetical society are
acts of promising, even though the way such promises are phrased may sound a bit
strange. The act of promising just is, in our view, a practice that allows an agent
to significantly increase the incentive he has to perform some action. If the person
breaks the promise then the fact that he has violated a moral norm of trying to fulfil
intentionally created expectations, the disdain of his peers and his decreased capacity
to have his future promises accepted by others all conspire to punish his lapse. Promises
are a form of self-incentivization where we try to gain trust by putting up some part
of our social reputation as collateral.
A promise is nothing more than the expressed intention to act in a certain way, where
the person making the promise has willingly incurred a strong reputational incentive
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to perform the action.11 The same goes for agreements. If A and B agree to perform
certain actions, as opposed to merely state their intentions to perform them, then this is
a case of both parties willingly opening themselves up to a certain degree of sanction
if they fail to perform the acts. This incentivizes both parties to perform the acts in
question, and hence helps to make their commitments credible.12 The sanctioning that
I willingly commit myself to can, of course, be a matter of degree. For our purposes
we can distinguish between ‘agreements’, where the sanctioning is relatively mild,
and a ‘mutual promise’13, where the relevant sanction is mutually understood to be
much harsher. The sanctions themselves are not mysterious, but will arise in virtue of
some mix of moral and prudential motivation.
5 People who lack the propositional attitudes required by Searle’s theory
can form complex, interlocking institutions
5.1 Companies, dividends, etc.
We have now defined the notions of ownership and the related notions of promises
and agreements. Ownership, in modern society, typically takes the form of a heavily
regulated, complex institution where most of the incentivization is done by the state,
while promises take the form of simple, informal agreements; we hope to have shown
that the incentivized action view can characterize the essence of such seemingly radi-
cally different institutions and bring them under a common rubric. Another reason for
choosing these two institutions to analyse is that they are both basic in the sense that,
once they are in place, they can serve to generate further institutional entities. Below
we will make a case for the claim that the incentivized action view, by availing itself of
notions like promises and ownership, can account for complex financial objects like
companies, employers, dividends and so on. Note that our efforts will, for now, fall far
short for defining such institutions. All we wish to show is that such institutions can, in
principle, come into being in recognizable form without any of the Searlean machinery
(collective acceptance; propositional attitudes that cannot be cast in non-institutional
terms) being involved.
Consider ten people who independently and simultaneously wash up on a desert
island and who all speak a version of English that contains no institutional fact terms.
Due to the practical gains to be had from sticking together and their belief in the
edifying effects of human society they live in the same place, talk, interact, and so
forth. (None of this necessarily presupposes the existence of an institutional fact, as
Searle uses the term ‘institution’.) Stipulate that the institution of private property
11 This puts us at odds with Searle’s controversial claim (1964) that, in some sense, the institution of
promising suffices to make it true that one should keep one’s promises. We do not think that it is the job of
a theory of promises to fully account for the normative status of promises—or, at least, no more than it is
the job of a geological theory to account for the beauty of mountains.
12 More on how incurring a cost in making a commitment can serve to make the commitment credible can
be found in Green (2007), who explores ideas proposed in Zahavi and Zahavi (1997).
13 A legal contract is just an agreement, or mutual promise, with an added incentivization mechanism,
namely legal enforcement.
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develops, meaning that there are situations where third parties are disincentivized,
by human agency or moral belief, from interfering with someone’s use of an object.
Some are disincentivized in virtue of believing that there are conditions under which
such interference is morally wrong, some are disincentivized in virtue of a norm
whereby those who interfere with other’s use of relevant objects are likely to suffer
such interference themselves, some are disincentivized in virtue of the fact that the
‘owner’, i.e. the party not so disincentivized, can punish them for such interference
or has friends who will, and so on. Further stipulate that there are shells that are used
as currency, i.e. that the people on the island are incentivized to acquire them for
exchange and not for some other specific use, with exchange being defined as being a
voluntary change in the subject of third party disincentivization, as explained above.
Now suppose that Alex and Bob make an ‘agreement’, as defined above, according to
which Bob will use Alex’s bucket to carry water from a river to where our ten unlucky
souls have set up camp. Bob will receive SS10 (ten sea-shells) for his efforts and Alex
then sell the water for SS20, making a profit. Alex, in other words, has the means of
production (capital, i.e. the bucket) and Bob is a paid labourer.
The notions of agreement, property, money and trade have already been defined in
terms of actions and incentives and all can understand their situation in terms of being
incentivized to act in a certain way. In other words, all know that they have a reason
to act in accordance with professed intentions, that they have a reason not to interfere
with how relevant individuals use certain objects, that the person whose use should not
be interfered with can change, and so on. Now let us suppose that Alex spent his sea-
shells quickly, whether on food stuffs gathered by others or alcohol brought onto the
island, and can no longer pay Bob. He now makes an ‘agreement’, as defined already,
with Carol to the effect that Carol will provide SS10 so that he can pay Bob to collect
water. In return Carol will get SS1 from Alex every day when there is at least SS1
profit. The agreement further stipulates that, should Alex be unable or unwilling to
continue the deal, Carol will take ownership of the bucket, but will not be able to claim
anything else. Stipulate that the relevant beliefs, expectations and power-relations are
such that all have an incentive, whether moral or practical, to keep their agreements.
In the above case we have certain familiar financial objects in their most basic
form. Alex has a certain financial liability which is limited to the value of his invested
capital, i.e. the value of his bucket. Alex owns a limited liability company, Bob is an
employee of this company and Carol is an investor in Alex’s company who receives a
fixed, daily dividend. The balance sheet of Alex’s company comprises the following:
equity invested by Alex and Carol to the value of the bucket and the working capital,
assets to the value of the bucket and the cash used for working capital. There are no
liabilities on the balance sheet. All of this can be described in terms of people being
incentivized to act in a certain way. Alex is incentivized to tell Bob what to do in a
way that other people are not and incentivized to hand Bob SS10 every time he hands
him a filled bucket, after which Alex is disincentivized from interfering with Bob’s
use of the SS10. Alex is incentivized by his agreement with Carol to give the water
to whoever hands him SS20, after which he is disincentivized to interfere with the
person’s use of the water and the person disincentivized to interfere with his use of
the SS20, Alex is incentivized to hand Carol SS1 every day and disincentivized to
interfere with what she does with it, and so on.
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To encounter a limited liability company is no more or less than to encounter actual
people locked into a certain stable pattern of incentivization. Interestingly enough,
when Searle’s initial account of corporations was challenged, he responded by saying
that “[a] corporation is just a placeholder for a set of actual power relations among
actual people” (2010, p. 22). We think that this idea is on the right track. But we also
think that following such ideas to their logical conclusion leads to the view that we can
characterize corporations in terms of the relations of incentivized action that obtain
between the relevant people, and so dispense with the Searlean apparatus of collective
intentionality, irreducibly institutional facts that have the structure of declaratives, etc.
In the above case we have described multiple, interlocking institutions—i.e. an
agreement, employer, employee, investor, limited liability company, dividends—in
terms of actions and incentives. This should make it plain that, once basic notions like
ownership and agreement are in place and defined in non-institutional terms, we can
recreate financial facts of any desired complexity on our hypothetical island.
5.2 A note on method
The method employed thus far primarily consists in the presentation of various Robin-
son Crusoe—style thought-experiments.14 We follow this time-honoured method for
the same reason that economists often do, namely that it allows us to abstract away
various real-world complications that do not affect the essential issue at hand. The
most basic advantage this has is that it allows us to deal the fact that institutional facts
are interlinked. In this way, I may withdraw money from the bank in order to allow
me to pay for a visa that allows me legal entrance into the United Kingdom. There
exist an enormous number of types of institutional facts, many of which constitutively
depend on the existence of other institutional facts. Our mortality prevents us from
analyzing them all; our aim is merely to give some substance to our claim that doing
so is possible in principle. For this reason it is often convenient to stipulate that several
people show up on an island, that there exists no institutional facts (in the technical
sense used here) on the island or between the relevant people, and then to describe the
process whereby such facts are created without any appeal to (irreducibly) institutional
facts that consist in the collective acceptance of statements of the form X counts as Y
in C .
All that our examples require is that the relevant incentives do not spring from an
(Searlean) institutional source, i.e. from a pre-existing irreducibly ‘institutional’ fact.
Given that, as has been explained before, Searle’s use of ‘institution’ is much narrower
than the ordinary one, this is not as difficult a demand to meet as one might think.
Searle, for example, does not view “the fact that today is 24 September 2004” or the
Christian calendar in general, as institutional, as these do not create deontic powers; the
same goes for the fact that someone is an ‘underachiever’, and practices like science,
religion and education, (2005, p. 18, 2010, p. 92). Nor does he view moral rules, norms
and beliefs as such facts. Searle only talks of institutions where certain status-functions,
14 Searle himself has defended the use of thought-experiments in clarifying the nature of institutional facts
(Searle 2005, pp. 20–21).
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i.e. where certain kinds of rights, duties and obligations, enter the picture (2005, p.
18). Where Searle would see someone with a duty which can only be characterized in
irreducibly institutional terms, we only see someone who is incentivized to perform
certain actions, with these actions being expressible in non-institutional terms.
Note that making our argument is not an empirical enterprise, but a theoretical–
conceptual one. One may object by saying that we cherry-pick our examples so as
to be amenable to our theory, i.e. that Searle may also come with hypothetical exam-
ples that vindicate his views. We do not think that this is so, for while specific cases
have illustrative value, they do not serve to decide the theoretical issue. To illustrate
this claim, consider a case as non-cherry picked, and favourable to Searle as con-
ceivable, i.e. a society of Searlean literalists that only creates institutional facts by
getting together and chanting things like “we count sea-shells as money”. Such chant-
ing will have no effect unless the people involved understand it as making it come
about that at least some of them will exchange sea-shells for goods, which means
that all now have an incentive to acquire such sea-shells for exchange. Hence we
still insist that the sea-shells are money purely in virtue of the fact that the professed
intentions served to incentivize everyone to acquire the sea-shells for exchange. In
other words, our analysis still applies unchanged. Searle, presumably, would similarly
interpret our hypothetical cases as cases where it comes about that a society collec-
tively accepts some sort of ‘X counts as Y in C’ type of fact. We do not dispute that
he could do so, but claim that our account is preferable as it does not complicate
ontology.
Note that, even if our hypothetical Searlean literalists only act in virtue of fully
believing the Searlean theory of institutional facts, their beliefs and behaviour still do
not constitute an objection to our theory. Our theory is not about the beliefs in the
mind of people, but about the actions that people are incentivized to perform, and
even action based on systematically false beliefs can still incentivize. For instance, if
a bookseller only accepts dollars due to the belief that they are backed by gold, I still,
given that a choice of currency is a kind of coordination game, have an incentive to give
the bookseller dollars in order to acquire books from him. In the same way, if some
people are only stopping at traffic lights due to a belief that the existence of a traffic
light is an irreducibly institutional fact, or the police only punishes those who run red
lights due to their belief that such objects are irreducibly institutional, such action still
gives someone free of such beliefs an incentive to treat traffic lights in the appropriate
way. Hence, we need not deny that people have Searlean beliefs about institutions;
we only need to deny that the irreducibly institutional reality that such beliefs are
supposed to be about exists in a way that can only be explained in institutional terms.
Our view concerns ontology, not epistemology; all we are committed to concerning
beliefs is, as indicated earlier, that the actions appropriate to legitimate institutions
can, in principle, be cast in some non-irreducibly institutional form. We take it that the
non-irreducibly institutional construal of paradigm institutional objects (traffic lights,
borders, money, ownership, exchange, promises, agreements), and our illustration that
people without propositional attitudes that feature non-irreducibly institutional con-
cepts, can form complex, interlocking institutions (employers, employees, investors,
limited liability companies, dividends), amounts to at least a prima facie case for this
contention.
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6 Bottom-up ontology and bottom-up genealogy: the order of explanation
The explanations given by the incentivized action view are naturalistic, ‘bottom-up’
explanations. In fact, it is bottom-up in two ways, both ontologically and genealogi-
cally. To explain this point, consider the analogy between our view of institutions and
another theory that is similarly ‘bottom-up’, namely the Gricean view of the develop-
ment of natural language conventions, due to Grice (1957).
The Gricean view of language concerns the emergence of signals with a non-natural
meaning, i.e. the kind of meaning a sign has, not because it is a natural symptom of
something else (as in ‘clouds mean rain’), but because the speaker intended it to signify
something. Grice’s key insight was that an action or utterance means non-naturally
that P only if it was produced with the intention that the audience comes to believe that
P by recognizing that very intention—i.e. by recognizing what the speaker intended
him to believe. In other words, a sign non-naturally means ‘There is a lion’ if it was
produced with the intention of letting the hearer come to believe ‘There is a lion’ by
recognising the speaker’s intention to cause the hearer believe ‘There is a lion’.
Grice identifies the above mechanism as the essence of communicative action.
From this, then, emerges the conventional system we know as natural language. Grice
views natural languages as systems of stabilized shared habits which could supplant
the Gricean mechanism of recognition of intentions. In other words, a signal comes
to mean something ‘timelessly’ and ‘conventionally’ when the meaning it acquired
on an initial occasion of use, i.e. a meaning it has in virtue of the Gricean mechanism
has sufficiently ‘stabilized’. On such a view the signal and its stable meaning are
the sediment of a practice of communication that is prior to a system of conventions
(Blackburn 1984) and not some ontologically novel entity. In this way Grice presents
a ‘bottom up’ account of how conventional meaning could emerge out of a practice
where people meant to communicate something and their intentions were correctly
recognized by their intended audience.
Our explanation of institutions is a similarly ‘bottom up’ explanation. Take, for
example, a case where tins of mackerel become used as currency.15 It can start with
some individual realizing that such tins are both generally popular and durable. This
then leads the person to acquire them with the intention of exchanging rather than
consuming them. Other individuals, either independently, or by picking up the idea
from others, then realise that the incentives operative in the local economy are such
that they have good reason to act similarly. At some point this behaviour becomes so
widespread that that we start calling the tins of mackerel ‘money’. But, as was the case
with the Gricean story about the emergence of natural language, the tins of mackerel
‘being money’ is no more than the sediment of a simple practice that has stabilised. The
‘mackerel-institution’, genealogically, comes about in virtue of a series of individuals
being incentivized to act in a certain way, and is, ontologically, no more than the fact
that such incentives are widespread and stable within a community.
Due to the above we hold that there is an important sense in which Searle gets
the ‘order of explanation’ the wrong way round. It is not the case, as Searle claims,
15 As happened in the case of US prisons. See Scheck (2008).
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that institutional facts are constituted by some sort of widespread social acceptance,
however this is understood, and that such widespread acceptance gives us something
fundamentally new. Rather ‘widespread acceptance’, i.e. recognition that a pattern of
incentives obtains, is simply the end of a continuum that starts with a point where
one person recognizes the existence of an incentive to act in a certain way. Hence
we hold that the origin and nature of institutional facts are to be understood in terms
of individuals who recognize that certain incentives obtain, just as, on the Gricean
view, stable natural languages emerge from individual cases of intention-recognition.
There is merely a difference of degree between the case where such incentives are
fleeting and recognition rare, and the case where the incentives are stable16 and their
recognition universal.
7 Further virtues of the incentivized action view
The biggest gap in the incentivized action view at present, as we see it, is that it still
owes an account of politically created entities like nations, governments and codified
law. In future work we plan to try and analyze such institutions; hopefully this will
serve to bridge the gap between the seemingly far-fetched nature of ‘desert island’
style examples and our common experience of institutional reality. We can, however,
only do so much in one paper; here we will end by highlighting some of the virtues
of the incentivized action view that have not been addressed thus far.
The incentivized action view allows for easy vertical integration with other theories.
Our theory of promising as self-incentivization, for instance, fits seamlessly into game
theory and mainstream economic theory in general. Game theory is antecedently com-
mitted to the existence of agents with various beliefs, courses of action and incentives
to perform such actions. The incentivized action view attempts to show that all talk
of money, borders, promises and the like can be accommodated into game theory as
simply being yet more talk about actions and incentives.17
The incentivized action view helps to prevent confusion by making certain mat-
ters much clearer than they otherwise are. These are not the type of confusions that
economists are prone to, but they are common among broader society. Take, for exam-
ple, the matter of private property. On our view, the whole idea of owning something
amounts to third parties being disincentivized to interfere with the use that an agent,
namely ‘the owner’, makes of a certain object. This immediately avoids the mistake
of thinking of ownership as a relation between a person and a thing, and makes it
plain that private ownership is a relation between an individual, a thing, and soci-
ety. It also makes it plain that ownership is not something that can only be created
by government decree, as well as making it plain that, if the government lacks the
16 Above we portray institutional facts as no more than the more stable end of a continuum of which the
other end is more loose incentive structures. An anonymous referee has pointed out that being at the end of
such a continuum does not necessarily amount to being ontologically of the same kind as other points on
the continuum. We agree but, in the absence of a positive argument in favour of viewing such a stabilized
set of incentives as ontologically distinct from incentives in general, will keep our ontology sparse.
17 Alternatively, consider the Marxist claim that we mystify the social by reifying social relations. Our
project can be described as the dereification of institutional facts.
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necessary power, a government decree is not even sufficient for the creation of private
property. Furthermore, it shows that our habit of talking of ownership as something
that either exists or does not is dangerously misleading. The question of whether one
owns something in a purely legal sense may be an absolute matter. But the law is
only one way of making ownership come about, and actual ownership is a matter
of third party disincentivization. Such disincentivization is a matter of degree. This
means that whether someone owns something is, in an important sense, similarly a
matter of degree. Simply put, there is a substantial difference between the degree
to which a Danish farmer owns his farm and the degree to which a Zimbabwean
farmer owns his farm. It is this sense of ownership, i.e. actual ownership, that explains
what we see in society and that should be the concern of sociological and economic
theory.
This leads us to a related point, which can be clearly seen once we recognize
institutions for what they are. When we talk of the political/economic system that
is in place in a certain country, we typically categorize them in terms of the system
that codified law tries to incentivize. In this way we will call countries capitalist if
the legal system is capitalist, call them socialist if the legal system is socialist, etc.
But, on the incentivized action view, it is plain that the system that prevails in a
country is fundamentally a matter of the actual incentives that do obtain, and not the
incentives that the government tries to create.18 When we categorise countries, or, for
that matter, companies or any institution, by codified law we are effectively attempting
to capture facts about a country, namely incentive sets, in terms of one mechanism of
bringing such incentives about. The ‘natural kinds’ at play when studying economics,
sociology and history are the stable sets of incentives that actually obtain, and they
need not correspond closely to codified law; the patterns are the appropriate classifier,
not the self-descriptions.
A further vice that often results from identifying an institution with the legal incen-
tives that try to co-create it, is to think that institutions are the kinds of things that
can easily be created or changed by simple decree. On our view it is plain that,
whereas legal decrees obviously play a role, they can do no more than cause a
change in an already existent set of incentives, among which they may well have
to ‘compete’ for priority and on whose prior existence they depend.19 While insti-
tutions are frequently created by law and decree, they can also be created and
maintained by social norms and moral motivation. The study of these matters is
both famously complicated and highly variable across both cultures and time; it is
our hope that the (still relatively undeveloped) incentivized action view will, once
brought to full fruition, provide a clear and unified framework for thinking about such
matters.
18 An interesting example is of how these thing should be done is Cukierman et al. (1992), who tried to
measure the de facto, as opposed to de jure, independence of central banks.
19 Or, as Hodgson (2006, p. 18) puts it: “[F]ormal institutions… always depend on nonlegal rules and
inexplicit norms in order to operate. If laws or declarations are neither customary nor embodied in indi-
vidual dispositions, then— “formal” or not—they have insignificant effects. They are mere declarations or
proclamations, rather than effective social rules.”
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